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STATE LEGISLATION AND MARITIME CASES
In recently denying to Congress the power to amend the Judicial
Code so as to extend to claimants other than seamen rights and remedies
under the workmen's compensation laws of any state, the Supreme
Court brought to a close the struggle of maritime shore workers to
obtain in full the benefits of modem state industrial legislation.
1 It
IState of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co. (1924) 264 U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct.
302. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented. The Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat at
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would perhaps be easier to acquiesce in the result reached if one could
be quite satisfied with the reasoning of the Court in so far as it involves
the problem of the power of the states to legislate on maritime matters.
Indeed, when one reads recent decisions in which this problem has
been considered, he discovers that the extent of the power of the states
to enact legislation affecting maritime matters is in such a state of
uncertainty that it is impossible to predict with any reasonable degree
of accuracy the fate of legislation not yet passed upon. Much of this
uncertainty, it is believed, is due to an erroneous notion that all cases
in which the validity of state statutes is involved can be solved through
the application of one set formula or test. The problem is not a single
one but comprises several distinct questions the answer to each of which
depends on distinct considerations of policy.
An examination of the decisions since the adoption of the Constitu-
tion will reveal that they may be divided into two classes: first, those in
which it was sought to enfor~e state legislation in admiralty, and
second, those in which it was sought to apply local legislation to mari-
time cases in state courts. The first involves a question of power of
a state to enact legislation affecting maritime law as administered by
the federal courts; the second, one of power of state tribunals to apply
to maritime cases their own rules of law.
Statutes which have been held to be enforceable in admiralty include
legislation giving a right of action for wrongful death,2 creating liens
for supplies to a vessel in her home ports and regulating pilotage fees.4
This legislation may be properly included within the term "legislation
affecting maritime law," since, being enforceable in admiralty, it sub-
stitutes local for general maritime rules of law or creates new local
L. 395) undertook to amend the provision of Secs. 24 and 256 of the Judicial Codewhich saves to suitors in all causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "the
right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it,"
by adding the words, "and to claimants the rights and remedies under the Work-
men's Compensation Law of any state." This amendment having been held uncon-
stitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct.
438, a second attempt was made to amend the saving clause by adding substantially
the words of the first amendment but, excluding from their scope injuries to master
and crew. Act of June io, 1922 (42 Stat at L. 634). In holding both amend-
ments unconstitutional the court treated them as attempts on the part of Congress
to delegate to the states the power to enact legislation affecting maritime law,
which would be prejudicial to the uniformity of the maritime law in its interstate
and international relations. Workmen injured on land may obtain relief under
local law. State Industrial Comnission v. Nordenholt Corp. (1922) 259 U. S.
263, 42 Sup. Ct 473.
'The Corsair (1892) 145 U. S. 335, 12 Sup. Ct. 949; The Hamilton (I9O7) 2o7
U. S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133.
' The Lottawanna (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 558; The J. E. Rumbell (1893) 148
U. S. i, 13 Sup. Ct. 498.
"Ex parte McNiel (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 236.
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maritime rules where before there were none. The moving factor in.
applying these local rules in maritime courts seems to have been a dsire
to make use of the relief they provide to fill gaps in the maritime law
which have resulted from prior decisions or inability of courts to act.
5
In recently re-affirming the doctrine that state wrongful-death acts are
enforceable in admiralty, the Supreme Court merely re-affirmed this
policy.6
While the first class of cases involves only a question of the
Constitutional power of the states to enact legislation affecting the
maritime law of admiralty courts, an important element in the second
is the fact that immediately after the adoption of the Constitution
the First Congress, by vesting in the Federal Courts "exclusive cogni-
zance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and
at the same time saving "to suitors in all cases the right of a common
law remedy where the common law is competent to give it," granted
admiralty and conmon law courts concurrent jurisdiction in maritime
cases.7 Until recently it had been generally supposed that the saving
clause authorized common law courts to apply to maritime cases their
own rules of substantive as well as procedural law s.8  However, in 1917,
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,9 the Supreme Court held the New
York Workmen's Compensation Act invalid in so far as it was sought
to apply it to a case involving compensation to the widow of a stevedore
killed while engaged in loading a vessel in New York harbor. This
case, the first to hold a state statute creating a substantive right, and
enforceable in a state court alone, inapplicable to a maritime tort, was
'In The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140, the Supreme Court
held that independently of statute a right of action for wrongful death does not
exist in admiralty. In The General Smith (819, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 438, it was held
that under the general maritime law of the United States there is no lien for
supplies to a vessel in her home port. In both instances relief in admiralty was
desirable; and since Congress had not legislated, the court had recourse to state
legislation. Likewise regulation of pilotage fees was desirable. Since such regu-
lation could only be made by legislation and Congress had not legislated, state
regulation was acquiesced in. On the other hand, if a rule of, liability exists in
admiralty and the matter is one not requiring regulation, there would be no need
for state legislation. Thus far no state statute has been applied in admiralty
where a rule of liability already existed under the maritime law.
6 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia (1921) 257 U. S. 233, 42 Sup. Ct. 89. See also.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski (1923) 261 U. S. 479, 43 Sup. Ct.
418.
'Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 9 (I Stat. at L. 73, 77) ; cf. Judicial Code, secs. 24,
256. Art. 3, sec. 2 of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
'Belden v. Chase, (1893) 150 U. S. 674, 14 Sup. Ct. 2
6 4; "cf. Steamboat Co. v.
Chase (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 522, in which a state wrongful-death statute was
held applicable to a maritime tort in a suit in a state court as a "common-law
remedy."
' 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524-
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followed by Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co.,10 in which a seaman
who had been injured in the course of his employment brought an
action in a common law court. It was held that his right to redress
was governed solely by maritime law and that, if action should be
brought in a common law court, that court could give only such relief
as would be given in admiralty. Mr. Justice McReynolds, speaking for
the Court, distinguished between a common law right and right to a
common law remedy, it being only the latter which is saved to suitors.
In thus holding that the right is created by maritime law and that the
only power in a common law court is that of applying its procedure
and remedies in enforcing it, the Supreme Court imposed on state
courts, in which actions under the saving clause are brought, a doctrine
similar to its own rule of Conflict of Laws as applied to foreign torts."1
Like the obligation created by foreign law in case of tort, the theory
here is that the obligation is created by maritime law, and following
the defendant, is equally enforceable in common law and admiralty
courts. Consistent application of this doctrine would seem to preclude
state courts from applying to maritime cases statutory rules" of sub-
stantive law different from those applied in admiralty, but it would not
impair the validity of decisions holding that local tribunals are free to
apply their own statutory rules of procedure in enforcing maritime
causes of action.1
2
However, the majority 'opinion in Southern Pacific. Co. v. Jensen
also announced a new test for determining the validity of state statutes
affecting maritime cases; though state legislation may to some extent
change, modify or affect maritime law, "no such legislation is valid
if it works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony of that
law in its international and interstate relations."'1  This test has been
10 (1918) 247 U: S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501. See also Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger (1922) 257 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 475; .Port of New York Stevedoring
Corp. v. Castagna (iga, C. C. A. 2d) 28o Fed. 618; Kennedy v. Cunard S. S. Co.
(ig2i, ist Dept.) 197 App. Div. 459, 18 N. Y. Supp. 402.
' In Slater v. Mexican N. 1. Co. (i9o4) 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 582,
the doctrine applied to foreign torts was expressed as follows: "The theory of the
foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligation, which like other
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found." For a criticism see COMMENTS (I918) 28 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 67.
'A number of decisions have held that the saving clause authorizes state courts
to apply to maritime cases local statutory rules of procedure, subject to the
limitation that a state may not authorize.proceedings in rem according to the course
in admiralty in maritime cases in state courts. Knapp Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey
(I9oo) 177 U. S. 638, 20 Sup. Ct. 824; Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine
Co. (19,5) 237 U. S. 303. 3.5 Sup. Ct. 596. To the effect that a state may not
authorize proceedings in ren in a state. court, see The Glide (1897) 167 U. S. 6o6,
17 Sup. Ct. 930; see also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co. (1924) 264 U. S.
109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274.
'(1917) 244 U. S. 205, 216, 217, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 529.
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applied in all subsequent cases in which state workmen's compensation
acts have been considered. But these statutes create substantive rights
enforceable in state tribunals only.1' Since their enforcement in state
tribunals cannot in any manner affect maritime law as applied in admi-
ralty courts, the question involved is, not one of power of a state to
change, modify or affect the general maritime law, but, more specifi-
cally, one of power of state tribunals to apply to maritime cases rules
of substantive law different from those applied in the federal admiralty
courts. If it is the purpose of the Supreme Court to preserve a theory
of "vested maritime rights" and workmen's compensation acts create
obligations ex delcto, they would never be applicable to maritime
cases.1 5  On the other hand, if they create obligations ex contractu,
their application to maritime cases would depend, perhaps, on the
nature of the contract and its binding force in admiralty.'8
Whether state tribunals should be precluded from applying to mari-
time cases statutory rules of substantive law different from those
"Workmen's Compensation Acts provide special machinery for the enforcement
of the rights they create No attempt has been made to obtain the relief they
grant in admiralty.
" Three theories of the nature of the obligation created by Workmen's Compen-
sation Acts have been advanced in Conflict of Laws cases. Massachusetts follows
a tort theory. In re Gould (1913) 215 Mass. 480, lO2 N. E. 693. Connecticut has
adopted a contract theory. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (19x5) 89 Conn.
367, 94 Atl. 372. New York seems to have adopted a quasi-contract theory.
Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler-Co. (1918) 224 N. Y. 9, ixg N. E. 878. If the
obligation is treated as arising from tort, following the analogy to the decisions in
Conflict of Laws cases, a theory of "vested maritime rights" would preclude
application of these statutes to maritime cases in state courts.
"'In Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode (1922) 257 U. S. 469, 42 SUP. CL
157, a shipbuilding company and a carpenter employee accepted a state workmen's
compensation act by making payments to an industrial accident fund. It was held
that the carpenter, who had been injured on a vessel in the course of construction,
but launched, was barred from proceeding in admiralty for damages. The court
seems to have adopted the view that the parties contracted with reference to the
state law. But its decision was also based on the test announced in the Jensen case.
If a contractual theory had been definitely adopted, the contract, being binding in
admiralty, would preclude relief in that court, but would permit relief in a state
tribunal in accordance with local law; and as a result maritime shore workers,
who contract with reference to local law, since they work partly on shore and
partly on board ship in port, would be entitled to .the advantages of state work-
men's compensation acts which were enacted for their benefit as well as for the
benefit of land workers. In enacting the second amendment Congress probably had
in mind the possibility of such a theory being adopted. It is believed that it would
have been better policy to adopt this theory in order to avoid some of the conse-
quences of denying to maritime workers who are not seamen, the advantages of
modern state industrial legislation. See dissent of Brandeis, J. in State of Wash-
ington v. Dawson & Co., supra note i.
It should be noted that application of the state act would not impair a doctrine
that state courts must apply to maritime cases rules of substantive law similar to
those in admiralty, as the state tribunal would be enforcing a contract that is
binding on the parties in admiralty and hence binding on them in a state court.
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applied in admiralty is a question on which opinions may differ, but it
is believed to be one which must be decided if confusion is to be avoided
in the future. As it is, as the result of attempts to reach a solution
through the application of an inadequate test, the problem involved in
the workmen's compensation cases has been confused with that involved
in applying state statutes in admiralty, and needless uncertainty intro-
duced into a subject already sufficiently complicated by prior decisions."
Baton Rouge, La.
GEORGE W. STUMBERG.
THE VARIABLE QUALITY OF A VESTED RIGHT
A recent New York case, Robinson v. Robbins Dry Dock & Repair
Co. (1924) 238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579, brings forward once again
that troublesome problem, whether a right' can become so "vested" as
to be beyond the reach of governmental power. The plaintiff recovered
under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act for the death
of her husband. Later the act was declared unconstitutional, but before
the plaintiff could assert her common law right, the statute of limita-
tions had barred her cause of action, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, so declaring. Thereafter, the Legislature, to give
relief to a large number of sufferers in this same situation, passed a
relief act, granting them a year within which to sue. The plaintiff
recovered in the Court of Appeals, the basis of the decision being the
well-established rule thus phrased by Mr. Justice Holmes :2 "Multi-
tudes of cases have recognized the power of the Legislature to call a
liability into being where there was none before, if the circumstances
were such as to appeal with some strength to the prevailing view of
justice, and if the obstacle in the way of creation were small."3
"The test of theJensen case is also open to the objection that it has no definite
meaning. A comparison of the legislation upheld with that declared invalid does
not reveal any reason why the one interferes with the general maritime law in its
international and interstate relations more than the other.
"Right" is here used in its general sense; but by splitting the term into some
of its component legal parts of "right, .... power," "privilege," and "immunity,"
the 'nature of the interest involved is made mbre manifest. Property interests areno more than legal relations of lesser or greater value, any one of which may
accurately be brought within the popular term, "private property."
'Danforth v. Groton Water Co. (igoi) 178 Mass. 472, 477, 59 N. E. 1033, 1034.
'Goshen v. Stonington (1822) 4 Conn. 2o9 (act validating a marriage performed
by minister under a disability) ; Watson v. Mercer (i834, U. S.) 8 Pet. 88 (act
validating deed of married women); Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (1853, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 16 Barb. 188 (act curing defect in organization of corporation);
Thomson v. Lee County (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 327 (act validating subscription of
bonds); Lane v. Nelson (1875) 79 Pa. 407 (act curing defect in judicial proceed-
ings) ; Ewell v. Daggs (1883) io8 U. S. 143, 2 Sup. Ct. 408 (act curing contract
void for usury); Evans-Snider-Buel Co. v. McFadden (i9o) 1o5 Fed. 293, 44
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This case falls in the field of so-called "curative acts." In these
cases the rights of an individual are subordinated to the "prevailing
view of justice." The same subordination of individual interest can be
found whenever a court strains a rule of law to mete out substantial
justice.4 It appears most prominently in cases under the police power,
the vague instrument whereby society effects its adjustments, when-
ever the court determines that some property interest is not so sacred
-but that it may be cut off by legislative enactment.' Somewhat differ-
ent terminology is used in the "curative acts" cases and in the police
power cases. In the former the term "vested right" indicates a prop-
erty interest which the court believes to be so fixed that it cannot be
impaired by retrospective legislation.6 In the latter, the term, when
employed at all, has generally the significance that "vested rights" 7 may
be taken away under the police power provided they are not'so impreg-
nable or sacred that they can be taken only under the power of eminent
domain." But this latter use of the term "vested right" seems to render
still more misleading an already misleading term; for the problem in
each group of cases is analogous. In the "curative acts" cases: Is
the property interest involved so sacred that it may not be impairediat
all? In the police power cases: Is the property interest so sacred that
C. C. A. 494 (act curing invalid mortgage against attaching creditor who had
already obtained judgment against the debtor); Dunbar v. Boston Ry. Corp.
(i9o2) 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 916 (act extending time for filing petitions for
damages, after time had expired); West Side Belt Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh Con-.
struction Co. (1911) 219 U. S. 92, 31 Sup. Ct. 196 (act curing contract void
because of a statute) ; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed. 19o3) 528-546.
"The fiction of common recovery was adopted by judicial legislation to meet the
popular demand for a relaxation of the practice of strictly entailing lands.
Taltarum's case (1473) Y. B. 12 Ed. IV, f. i9, pl. 25. Similarly the anomalous
doctrine of ancient lights was created by the English Court, probably influenced- by
the plague-scare terrorizing London, to keep all the light and air'possible. Lewis "
v. Price (1761) 2 Wms. Saunders. 175a, note.
'See infra note 18.
'Huff man v. Alderson's Admr. (1876) 9 W. Va. 66.
The courts even in police power cases occasionally speak of some legislative
act as unconstitutional as impairing "vested rights." Farist .Steel Co. v. Bridge-
port (18gi) 6o Conn. 278, 283, 2z Atl. 56i, 563; Arizona. Copper Co. v. Hammer
(1919) 250 U. S. 400, 423, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 557. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles (9o4)
195, U. S. 223, 239, 25 Sup. Ct. 18, 22, the court says, "The plaintiff .... had
acquired 'property rights.'"
'Private property may always be taken by the government for public purposes
under the power of eminent domain, and where an interest is involved which lends
itself to compensation the courts will be found determining whether the police
power or the power of eminent domain is the appropriate instrument. See
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. (1871, U3. S.) 13 Wall. 166. But where the interest
does not lend itself to compensation, the courts do not mention the power of
eminent domain;,,saying that since the interest may not be taken under the police
power it may not be taken at all. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan (1924) 264 U. '.
504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412.
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it may not be taken away without compensation? And in each instance
"Due Process" is invoked to protect the rights of the individual.
just as the problems involved are analogous, so are the processes of
rationalization by which the courts reach their conclusions. These
famous clauses: "Due Process of Law," "Equal Protection of the
Laws," and others, have defended the interests of the individual against
the encroachment of society; but their restrictive interpretation has
gradually receded before the expanding police power.9 The point
of contact of these opposing forces is constantly shifting.'0 An ulte-
rior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking
of private property," says Mr. Justice Holmes, in a case involving the
police power," practically paraphrasing his language in the "curative"
acts" cases. In the instant case the Legislature was enabled, in com-
plete harmony with "Due Process," to take from the defendant his
privilege not to respond in damages, worth to him in money the exact
amount of the damages he was later called upon to pay.Y2 . Under the
9 Meffert v. State Board of Medical Registration (19o3) 66 Kan. 710, 718, 72 Pac.
247, 25o, aff'd (1904) 195 U. S. 625, 25 Sup. Ct. 79o; Arizona Copper Co. v.
Hammer, supra, note 7.
10 1 Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1888) 267.
'Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, Io, 31 Sup. Ct. I86, 187.
"When private property becomes attached with a public interest it ceases to be
juris privati only." Hale, C. J. in De Portilus Mars, i Harg. Law Tracts, 78.
This doctrine has been relied on in many police power cases. Munn v. Illinois
(1876) 94 U. Sr. 113, 132; Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 517, 533, 12 Sup.
Ct. 468, 472; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas (1914) 233 U. S. 389,'408, 34
Sup. Ct. 6r2, 617. Compare: "Police powers of a state are nothing more or less
than the powers of government, inherent in every sovereignty." Taney, C. J., in
License Cases (1847, U. S.) 5 How. 504, 583.
"Ordinarily the defendant's defense might have been said to- be "vested"
though there is some conflict on this point. Where the statute of limitations has
run in favor of the adverse possessor of real or personal property the title to that
property becomes "vested" as though by grant, and is beyond the reach of the
legislature. Chapin v. Freeland (f886) 142 Mass. 383, 8 N. E. 128; Toltec
Ranch Co. v. Cook (903) 191 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 166; Taylor, Due Process
(1917) 523, 524. Likewise a contract of record becomes "vested" when the
period for filing bill of exceptions has expired. Johnson v. Gehbauer (19o2)
159 Ind. 271, 64 N. E. 855; Smith v. Walton (1924, N. J. Ch.) 225 Atl. 878. And
in defenses to debt actions the majority rule favors the "vesting" of the defense.
Chambers-v. Gallagher (I918) 177 Calif. 704, 171 Pac. 931; Clark, Adverse
Possession of One's Ozm Debt (2929) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 91. Though for
a long time a contrary view was held. Campbell v. Holt (1885) 115 U. S. 620,
6 Sup. Ct. 2o9. See 3 Ames, Select Essays (igog) 569, that Campbell v. Holt
"stands almost alone," and Robinson v. Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. (1924)
238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579, for a similar view. This distinction that has been
drawn between the effect of the statute of limitations in actions for real or per-
sonal property and the effect in debt actions may be due to the fact that the
early jurists could not see how there could "be a transfer of a right unless the
right is embodied in some corporeal thing." 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of
English Law (2d ed. 195o) 226. But, expressing the modem view, Holmes, J.
says in Portuguese-American Bank of San Francisco v. Welles (1916) 242 U. S.
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police power, in nuisance cases, individuals, also in harmony with "Due
Process," have been deprived of privileges relating to the use of their
property, losing property interests as valuable as those of which the
defendant was deprived. 13 But the police power has expanded more
startlingly than has the doctrine of the "curative acts" cases. In the
Granger Cases,' 4 and later in the Insurance Company cases,' 5 semi-
public corporations lost privileges which were property interests of
large value; while under prohibition laws, going brewery concerns, 8
worth as businesses many millions of dollars, were reduced to practical
Worthlessness.' 7 Such use of the police power'8 was not contemplated
before the Granger cases, and no one can tell to what uses it may be
put in the future. Under the police power, and its legitimate offspring,
the doctrine of the "curative acts" cases, it is impossible to say that a
property interest is so sacred to-day that it may not be taken away
to-morrow.
There is in fact no standard of sacredness.19 The language that Mr.
7, I, 37 Sup. Ct. 3. 4, "when a man sells a horse, what he does, from the point
of view of the law, is to transfer a right, and a right being regarded by the law as a
thing, even though a'res incorporalis, it is not illogical to apply the same rule to a
debt that would be applied to a horse." Compare note x, supra.
'Pa. Lead Co.'s Appeal (i88o) 96 Pa. 116: Baltimore & P. Ry. v. Fifth
Baptist Church (1883) io8 U. S. 317, 2 Sup. Ct. 719.
'Munn v, Illinois, supra note i; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Iowa (1876) 94 U.
S. 55; Peik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (876) 94 U. S. 164; Chicago M. & St. P.
Ry. v. Ackley (1876) 94 U. S. 179; Winona & St. Peter Ry. -. Blake (1876) 94
U. S. i8o; 3 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1922) ch. 33.
The Granger cases "evidently represent a different point of view of the sacredness
of private rights and of the powers of a Legislature, from that entertained by
Chief Justice Marshall and his contemporaries." Bryce, loc. cit. supra note 3o.
" German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, supra note ii.
" Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623, Sup. Ct 273; Crowley v. Christensen
(i89o) 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13.
1'It had been previously thought that rights of corporations had been settled as
absolutely "vested" and indefeasible. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (18ig, U.
S.) 4 Wheat. 518. There it was held that in the absence of a reservation of
power the rights granted in the charter of a corporation could not be taken away
by a subsequent legislature.
Many valuable property interests have been taken away under the police power.
Barbier v. Connolly (1885) 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357 (denying privilege of
working in laundries between io p.m. and 6 a. m.) ; Davis v. The State (188o)
68 Ala. 58 (forbidding transportation of cotton at night); Powell v. Peonsyl-
vania (i888) I27 U.. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (suppressing the sale of oleomar-
garine). And see many cases cited in Wilson v. New (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 349,
\37 Sup. Ct. 298, 3o2, and Warren, op. cit. supra note 14, ch. 38. Also a striking
recent case where it was held' constitutional under the police power to prevent
negroes from voting in primaries. Chandler v. Neff (3924, W. D. Tex.) 298 Fed.
515. The doubtful character of this decision serves to emphasize the indefinite
limits of the police power.
"Compare the campaign remark of John W. Davis at Omaha, Neb., N. Y.
Times, Sept 7, 1924, p. 28: "When this country was set up . . . . we gave
Americans . . . . certain fundamental rights which can never be taken away." *
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Justice Holmes uses in speaking of the police power,2" like his language
in referring to the "curative acts" cases,2 seems to imply the existence
somewhere of a definitely fixed "property right. '2  But his words of
apparent limitation do not in fact limit, and have little significance
save as they indicate a natural shrinking from laying down in cold
words a doctrine so pregnant with unlimited power. Private property
has been taken in the police power cases and in the "curative acts" cases
in all but name.23  And we are driven to the conclusion that the term"vested right" as used in the latter cases, and occasionally even in
the former, is one of convenience and not of definition.24 It cannot
mean more than a property interest, the infringement of which would
shock society's sense of justice. For the idea of a "vested right" is
less legal than political and sociological. The traditions, mores, and
instincts of a community determine it. The conception of a "vested
right" in a socialistic state will naturally differ greatly from that in a
purely individualistic state; just as the conception of a "vested right"
in war time25 or emergency " will little resemble the conception that
prevails in days of peace. And since society's concept of a "vested
"Supra note ii.
' Supra note z
"Compare the language of Holmes in Danforth v. Groton Water Co., supranote 2: "The prevailing judgment of the profession has revolted at the attempt
to place immunities which exist only by reason of some slight technical defect onabsolutely the same footing as those which stand on fundamental grounds. Itmay be that sometimes it would have been as well not to attempt to make outthat the judgment of the court was consistent with constitutional rules, if suchrules were to be taken to have the exactness of mathematics. It may be that itwould have been better to say definitely that constitutional rules, like those ofthe common law, end in a penumbra where the Legislature has a certain freedomin fixing the line, as has been recognized with regard to the police power."
"3 "The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give rigidity to ourconception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretelyclothed." Holmes, J. in Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S'. 135, 155, 41 Sup. Ct.
458.,459. See also comment on "manual tradition," supra note 12."4 See supra note 7. The attempted definitions of the police power show theirvagueness on their face, and that they state conclusions and not reasons: "Policepower is not subject to any definite limitations, but is co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the safeguard of public interests." Camfield v. UnitedStates (1897) 167 U. S. 518, 524, 17 Sup. Ct. 864, 866. See similar statementregarding "due process of law." Davidson v. New Orleans (1877) 96 U. S. 97,
104.
24 By conscription in war time the individual's most valuable interest, his liberty,is taken away. In the event of future wars we are promised by the 1924 plat-forms of the two major parties that "every resource which may tontribute tosuccess" shall be "drafted." Platform of Republican Party (1924) i; Demo-
cratic Campaign Book (1924) 39.
2'Rent laws were justified under the due process clause "as a temporary meas-
ure .... to tide over a passing trouble"; whereas they could "not be upheld asa permanent change." Block v. "Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 157, 41 Sup. Ct. 458,460; Wilson v. New, supra note 18 (Adamson law upheld "because of the existing
emergency")..
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right" is the measuring yardstick of the right .itself, it must be said
that in any absolute sense there is no such thing as a "vested right,"
and that 'there is no property interest so sacred that it may not be sacri-
ficed to the public need.
2 7
Nevertheless, society's conception of a "vested right" must be inter-
preted. Until about 189o the Supreme Court, and following its lead
the courts of the several states, declared that where a legislature acted
reasonably under the appropriate power it was not within the province
of the court to pass on the social wisdom of the measures enacted.
28
Thus the ultimate definition was for the legislature; and the remedy
for abuse of power was, as a famous judge said, for the people at the
polls. 2 19 Since the eighteen-nineties, however, the Supreme Court has
undertaken, against the protests of a minority of its membership, to
set up as the standard of a "vested right" its own idea of the "ulterior
public advantage.13 0 . But a single court cannot represent the diverg-
ing views of a large number of individual communities. At best it
can represent but the average. The result has been the cutting off of
social and political experiments in some of these states, because their
view of a "vested right" has shocked the sense of justice of the court.3 1
The Progressive Party this year proposes a considerable reduction of
the court's powers. Less radical opinion speaks for a return to the
theory of 189o, if not by judicial reinterpretation of its functions, then
by the removal by constitutional amendment of the Due Process Clause,
which would accomplish the same result.32  There seems, however, to
"It is interesting that in those statutes upheld under the police power the
individual is placed under a duty to society in general, while in Robinson v. Robbins
Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 12, a further step is taken, the defendant
being placed under a duty to a specific individual.
"Those employments .when too long employed the legislature has judged to
be detrimental to the 'health of employees, and so long as. there is a reasonable
ground for believing that this is so its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed
by the Federal courts." McKenna, J. in Holden v.* Hardy (1898) I69 U. S. 366,
395, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 389.
" Waite, C. J. in Munn v. Illinois, supra note I1, at p. I34.
"See Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Hough, Due
Process of Law To-day (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 218; Smith, Decisive Battles
of Constitutional Law (July, 1924) A. B. A. JoUR. 505. This is one phase of the
clash between Federalism and States Rights. Mr. Smith calls the result a
"revolution."
' "There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of
social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insu-
lated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments may
seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect."
Holmes, J. dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 30.
"Clark, The Courts and the People, Locomotive Engineers' Journal (Aug. 1923)
626; editorial, The Red Terrorism of Judicial Reform, The New Republic (Oct.
I, 1924) I2O; Borchard, LaFollette and the Courts, The Nation (Oct. 29, 1924)
468.
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be some evidence in recent decisions of the Supreme Court of a ten-
dency toward the view of i89o. ss But whatever theory be adopted,
the difficulty that causes such a volume of disagreement 4 is the chame-
leon character of the term "property right" or "vested right": the fact
that it is not an absolute standard, but a variant which each man, lay-
man, legislator, and judge, determines individually out of his own
background.
CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGES FOR OFFICIAL ACTS
The state of mind of the disappointed litigant, prepared to disagree,
and perhaps enibittered, has sometimes led to suits against judges for
acts done in a judicial capacity. Such actions raise the question as to
whether judges are immune from civil responsibility in damages for
official acts; and courts jealous of their dignity and independence, have
not been disposed to look too favorably at these attempts to undermine
their prestige.1  In Dean v. Kochendorfer (1924) 237 N. Y. 384, 143
N. E. 229, a judgment was rendered against a City Magistrate for
malicious prosecution and abuse of process. While the case presents
interesting questions as to malicious prosecution and abuse of process, 2
it is intended here to examine solely the problem of judicial responsi-
bility to the injured litigant.3 Unfortunately the question seems not
"See the dissenting opinions of Taft, C. J. and Holmes, J. in Adkins v.
Children's Hosp. (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394; Smith, op. cit. supra
note 30, at p. 51o.
"See the wide and excited differences of opinion 6ver the Granger cases as
illustrated by press comments of the time. Warren, op. cit. supra note 9, at pp.
303-31o. Also the same disagreement among members of the Supreme Court
itself. Munn v. Illinois, supra note ii; Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Iowa, supra
note 14. For later phases of the same dissension see Pomeroy, The Supreme
Court and State Repudiation (1883) 17 Am. L. REV. 684; Vance, The Road to
Confiscation (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2851; Swayze, The Growing Law
(915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1, i7; Brewer, Protection to Private Property from
Public Attack (i8gi) passim.
"De fide et officio Judicis non recipitur quaestio, sed de scientia, sive error sit
juris sive facti. The law doth so much respect the certainty of judgments, and
the credit and authority of judges, as it will not permit any error to be assigned
that impeacheth them in their trust and in wilful abuse of the same; but only in
ignorance, and mistaking either of the law of the case or matter in fact." Sir
Francis Bacon, Law Tracts (2d ed. 1741) 82. However, in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries justices were in certain situations subject to pehalty or amerce-
ment for erroneous judgments. Morgan, Brief History of Special Verdicts and
Special Interrogatories (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 575, 582-586.
'The ordinary case of malicious progecution deals with procedure instituted by
the now defendant before a judicial officer; here the judge himself starts the
action. For a wide distinction between an action against a prosecutor for mali-
cious prosecution, and one against a magistrate for malicious conviction, see
Winfield The Present Law of Abuse of Legal Procedure (1921) 219.
'Judicial responsibility in general is here considered without special reference to
"privilege" of the judiciary in defamation, as to which see COMMENTS (Ig9)
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to have been raised by counsel in the instant case. There are traces of
the exemption from responsibility early in the reports,4 and according
to Chancellor Kent "it has a deep root in the common law."'5  But
while it is frequently asserted that the exemption applies to all persons
acting in a judicial capacity, of whatever degree,6 it is necessary to
consider different grades of judges and different kinds of acts7 in order
to ascertain the extent of the doctrine to-day.
Beginning then, with judges of courts of superior or general juris-
diction,8 it is well settled that no action can be maintained against them
for judicial acts, irrespective of motive.9 As to judges of courts of
inferior or limited jurisdiction,10 there has been some dispute; their
lesser rank has perhaps prevented them from receiving as much pro-
tection, and their freedom from responsibility is not as extensive. The
difference in the authorities is professedly based on the individual
court's conception of the materiality of two elements: lack of jurisdic-
tion11 and bad faith. Thus some courts have held that a judge of an
inferior court acting without power (beyond his jurisdiction) is civilly
answerable to the aggrieved litigant regardless of motive.12 On the
other hand, it has been held that an act in excess of power unaccom-
panied by bad faith will not subject the judge to responsibility in a
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 765, 766; 32 ibid. 414. For protection afforded to judges
acting under unconstitutional statutes, see (905) 3 MicH. L. Rzv. 486; (196)
4 ibid. 239; NoTEs (1906) 6 CoL.. L. REv. 586.
'Winfield, The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure (1921) 78.
'Yates v. Lansing (i8io, N. Y. Sup. C.) 5 John. 282, 291.
'2 Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 19o6) 795 and note.
'It is quite difficult in practice, sometimes, to distinguish between a ministerial
and a judicial act; the rule seems to be that in the former the exemption cannot
be relied on. See Evarts v. Kiehle (1886) 2o2 N. Y. 296, 6 N. E. 592.
For the position of officers acting in a quasi-judicial capacity with respect to
the rule here involved, see Mechem, Law of Public Offices and Officers (189o)
secs. 636-643; Cooley, op. cit. supra note 6, pp. 797-805.
For' a mere error in judgment there obviously should be no responsibility; to
impose responsibility here would be to discourage anyone from ever ascending the
bench. Cooley, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 792.
' General jurisdiction is here used to indicate a power to adjudge generally over
the subject matter and person without respect to any particular set of facts.
9Floyd v. Barker (16o8, Star Chamber) 12 Co. 23; Fray v. Blackburn (1863,
Q. B.) 3 B. & S. 576; Bradley v. Fisher (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 335.
"Limited jurisdiction is here used to indicate a power to adjudge only within
prescribed limits.
'For an analysis of the term "jurisdiction" see Cook, The Powers of Courts
of Equity (1915) 15 Cor. L. Rxv. io6, io7. "Jurisdiction" is here used in the
strict sense, denoting "power to act."
'Piper v. Pearson (1854, Mass.) 2 Gray, i2o (committed witness for contempt
in case over which another court had exclusive jurisdiction) ; Vaughn v. Congdon
(883) 56 Vt. iii (issued warrant on complaint void on its face); Grace v. Teague
(i888) 8i Me. 559, 18 Atl. 289 (tried and sentenced after term of office had
expired).
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civil suit." Where the act complained of is an abuse of jurisdiction,
i. e. within the jurisdiction of the court but prompted by bad motive,
there is a similar divergence of opinion. It has been held that such
an act renders the judge civilly responsible.14 It seems, however, thatthe greater number of American courts are in favor of absence ofresponsibility."" English authorities are similarly against responsi-
bility'6
There is no compelling logic demanding different results based onthe presence or absence of the elements enumerated above. Modem
cases show that the distinction between judges of courts of inferior
,or limited jurisdiction and those of superior or general jurisdiction indetermining responsibilty is not being strictly followed.'1' On prin-
ciple it would seem that there should not be such a marked distinction;
the reasons for lack of responsibility in the latter class apply withequal force in the former. An absolute freedom from responsibility,
regardless of the status of the court and the character of the act,
"S Thompson v. Jackson (1895) 93 Iowa, 376, 6i N. W. 1004 (entered judgment
in good faith on non-resident not served with notice). See criticism in 27 L. R. A.
92, note. See Health v. Halfbill (1898) ro6 Iowa, 131, 133, 76 N. W. 522, 523.Similarly, a magistrate having acquired jurisdiction and proceeded beyond it hasbeen exempted from civil responsibility unless he acted maliciously. Starrett v.Connolly (1912, 2d Dept.) i5o App. Div. 859, 135 N. Y. Supp. 325. See Boznanv. Seaman (I912, 2d Dept.) 152 App. Div. 69o, 694, 137 N. Y. Supp. 568. 57I.And where the judge erroneously and wilfully attempted to take jurisdiction,*having no power over crimes punishable by imprisonment in state prison, he washeld responsible. Robertson v. Parker (1898) 99 Wis. 652, 75 N. W. 423."Knell v. Briscoe (1878) 49 Md. 414 (malicious rendition of judgment) ; seePepper v. Mayes (1884) 8I Ky. 673, 676.
"Stone v. Graves (1843) 8 Mo. 148 (neglect, and wilful refusal to give judg--tent) ; Pratt v. Gardner (1848, Mass.) 2 Cush. 63 (maliciously received ground-less complaint) ; Raymond v. Bolles (1853, Mass.) ii Cush. 315 (issued writ onfalse claim and secreted and destroyed it after service) ; Irion v. Lewis (1876)56 Ala. 19o (wilfully tampered with jury) ; Kress v. State (1878) 65 Ind. 1O6(fraudulently rendered smaller judgment); Curnow v. Kessler (r896) Iio Mich.io, 67 N. W. 982 (maliciously issued summons to enable plaintiff to collect civildemand); see Moser v. Summers (1916) 172 Ky. 553, 557, I89 S. W. 715, 717;Seneca v. Colvin (1917, 4th Dept) 176 App. Div. 273, 275, 162 N. Y. Supp.
834, 835.
"6 (1848) ii & 12 Vict. c. 44, sec. i, required that malice must be alleged andproved in bringing an action against a justice of the peace. But it has been pointed-out that this statute, while it provides for bringing the action, does not create theremedy, but merely assumes its existence. The statute therefore regulates whatdoes not necessarily exist. The existence of civil liability, nevertheless, can beshown both prior to 1848 and after the passage of the act. See Cave v. Mountain(i84o, C. P.) i Man. & G. 257, 263; Kendall v. Wilkinson (i855, Q. B.) 4 E. &'B.679, 689. Gelen v. Hall (1857, Exch.) 2 Hurlst. & N. 379, however, has been taken-to indicate the beginning of the rule against the responsibility of Justices of thePeace. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 2, at p. 218.' Broonz v. Douglas (1912) 175 Ala, 268, 57 So. 86o; 44 L. R. A. (N. s.) 164,
171, note.
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would seem the sounder social policy.
s  By alowin i the civil action
the magistrate's position is weakened; the decisions of one who has
been adjudged guilty of malicious prosecution are not unlikely to go
unquestioned. Furthermore ", , . . a prosecution at the instance of
the State is a much more effective method of bringing him to account
than private suit . . . . Where an officer is impeached his whole career
may be gone into .... but in private suits the party is confined to the
facts of his own case."'
0  In Dean v. Kochendorfer the provision of
the Penal Law which the court cited
20 to show that there was abuse of
process, provides for the removal of a magistrate acting as the defen-
dant here did. The result would have been more desirable had the
Penal Law been allowed to take its course. While there was here
perhaps a clear case of an injustice done to the attorney, the rule should
not be relaxed for occasional injustices.
21 "One of the leading pur-
poses of every wise system of law is to secure a fearless and impartial
administration of justice."
22
THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO PARDON CRIMINAL CONTEMPTS
OF COURT'
A general popular disapproval of the exercise of the power to punish
for contempt of court in cases of political and public interest has led
many of our executives to apply their pardoning power to cases of
"Reasons which have been advanced for non-responsibility are: (I) It would
take up the judge's time unnecessarily to consider his own defense. (2) It would
invite him to consult public opinion when he ought to be uninfluenced by it.
(3) It would increase litigation-the judge trying the first judge's responsibility
could also be tried, and so on ad infinitem. (4) It would deter capable men from
taking office. Cooley, op. cit. supra note 7, at P. 793 et seq.; Mechem, op. cit.
supra note 7, sec. 620.
" Mechem, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 403; Cooley, op. cit. supra note 6, at p. 794.
" Penal Law, N. Y. (igg) sec. 854; (1924) 237 N. Y. 384, 39o.
' Salmond, Law of Torts (5th ed. 1920) 539.
'Bigelow, J. in Piper v. Pearson, supra note 13, at p. 122.
' The courts generally distinguish between contempts which consist of violation
of a court order made for the benefit of a party to a civil action, and contempts
which consist of acts or conduct tending merely to interfere with the process of
the 'court. The former are denominated civil contempts, the latter criminal con-
tempts. People, ex rel. Munsell, v. Court of Oyer & Terminer (1886) 1o1 N. Y.
245, 4 N. E. 259; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 418,
31 Sup. Ct 492; Adams v. Gardner (1917) 176 Ky. 252, 195 S. W. 412; Beale,
Contempt of Court, Criminal & Civil (1908) 21 HARv. L. Rxv. 161; Taylor,
Procedure in Contempt Cases .(1914) 2 VA. L. REv. 265. The essential nature of
civil contempts being coercive, to secure the civil rights of party litigants, it is
generally agreed that they are not within the pardoning. power. The executive
may not destroy civil rights. In re Bahama Islands (1893, P. C.) A. C. 138;
In re Nevitt (1902, C. C. A. 8th) 117 Fed. 448; People, ex rel. Brundage, v.
Peters (1922) 305 Ill. 223, 137 N. E. 118; State, ex rel. Rodd, v. Verage (1922)
177 Wis. 295, x87 N. W. 830; Contempt of Court and the Pardoning Power
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contempt.2  In the recent case of State v. Magee Pub. Co.3 the defen-
dant was tried for criminal libel. During the pendency of the libel
action, he published in a newspaper owned and controlled by him,
derogatory remarks concerning the justice presiding at his trial. He
was tried and convicted of contempt of court, but immediately thereafter
was pardoned by the governor. The Supreme Court of New Mexico
held the pardon valid.' An opposite conclusion was reached by a lower
federal court in the recent case of United States v. Grossman.5  A
temporary injunction was issued restraining the defendant from selling
liquor in violation of the Volstead Act. The defendant disobeyed the
injunction, and was imprisoned for contempt. The President having
pardoned the defendant, the court' held that the pardon was invalid.6
In this country the power to pardon has its source in constitutional
provisions. The federal and state constitutions limit it to "crimes oroffenses against the state except treason and impeachment."* The first
difficulty encountered is in attempting to determine whether criminal
contempts are offenses within such provisions. Little help is to be
derived from precedent.8 -It has been held repeatedly that a prosecu-
tion for contempt does not require the regular criminal procedure of
indictment or trial by jury.' On the other hand a criminal contempt
has been held to be within the criminal statute of limitations, and also
within the federal statute providing for the removal of criminals from
one federal district to another.Y0
(1893) 46 AL. L. JotR. 259. For the difficulties that exist in drawing the line in
particular cases between criminal and civil contempts, see People, ex rel. Stearns,
v. Marr (905) 181 N. Y. 463, 74 N. E. 43z; Hake v. People (19o7) 230 Ill. 174,
82 N. E. 561; NoTEs (1921) 5 MINr. L. REv. 459; (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 617.
-'See (1921) 7 A. B. A. Joun. 658; (1922) 8 A. B. A. Joun. 136. See also
COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 537.
" (1924, N. M.) 224 Pac. 1o28 (one judge dissenting).
'Accord: Rz parte Hickey (1840, Miss.) 4 S. & M. 751; State, ex rel. Van
Orden v. Bauvmnet (1872) 24'La. Ann. 119; Sharp v. State (1899) 1o2 Tenn. 9,
49 S. W. 752.
' (May 15, 1924) N. D. Ill. E. Div. The case is now in the United States
Supreme Court and will be decided in the October term.
'Accord: Taylor v. Goodrich (1897) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 1o9, 40 S. W. 515.
'U. S. Const. Art. 2, sec. 4; N. M. Const. Art. 5, sec. 6; Mich. Const. Art. 6,
sec. 9; Conn. Const. Art. 4, sec. IO.
'For different definitions of "crime or offense" -see State v. Ostwalt (1896)
i18 N. C. 1208, 24 S. E. 66o; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 5; I Wharton, Cri-iinal
Law (ilth ed. 1912) 18.
'State v. Markuson (1895) 5 N. D. 147, 64 N. W. 934; People v. Tool (19o5)
35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224; Ex parte Allison (195o) 48 Tex. Cr. App. 634, 90 S. W.
492; State v. Thomas (19o6) 74 Kan. 360, 86 Pac. 499; State v. Sides (1g91)
95 Kan. 633, 148 Pac. 624; Rapaljie, Contempts (1886) 12.
"A federal statute provided that, "No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or
punished for any offense not capital .... unless-the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within three pears after such offense shall have been
committed." Act of April 13, 1876 (i9 Stat. at L. 32). Held, that the statute
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The lack of a settled judicial definition of the term 'offense' permits
a court passing upon the question in the first instance to be influenced
by its notions of the nature of the contempt power." Adopting
Wilmot's unpublished opinion in King v. Almon,
2 that the power to
summarily punish for contempt is of immemorial usage and is an
inherent attribute of our judiciary, it has been said that an executive
pardon is an unwarranted interference with the judicial power.'
3
Recent investigations have, however, thrown considerable doubt on the
correctness of Wilmot's opinion.' 4 The evidence seems to show that
prior to the sixteenth century, constructive contempt by one other than
an officer of the law was punishable only after trial by jury in the
regular criminal procedure.' 5 At its source, the power to punish for
contempt was regarded not as a mysterious attribute of judicial power
but as a practical means to assure the unimpeded transaction of the
court's business. Where the obstruction was indirect, it was thought
that no impairment of efficiency would result from resorting to the
regular criminal procedure. In considering, to-day, the applicability of
the power to pardon to cases of contempt, the use of a meaningless
phrase such as "inherent power" seems only to cloud the issue, which
is practicability and public expediency.' 0
applied to contempts. Gompers v. United States (1913) 233 U. S. 6o4, 34 Sup.
Ct. 693.
A statute provided that "For any crime or offense against the United States,
the offender may by any commissioner of a circuit court .... be arrested and
imprisoned, or bailed as the case may be, for trial before such court of the
United States as by law has cognizance of the offense." Act of May 28, 1896
(29 Stat. at L. 184). Held, that the statute applied to contempts. Castner v.
Pocahontas Collieries Co. (19o2, D. Va.) 17 Fed. 184. See Barrett, Contempt
in the Federal Courts (IgI) 72 CENT. L. JouR. 5.
'1 See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 71; Pound, "Courts
and Legislation," 9 Modern Legal Philosophy Series (1917) 223.'
(1765, K. B.) Wilmot's Notes 243.
See Larremore, Constitutional Regulation of Contempt of Court (i9oo) 13-
HARv. L. Rxv. 615.
1 See the series of essays by Fox, The King v. Almon (igo8) 24 L. QUART. REV.
184, 266; The Summary Process to Punish Contempt "(19o) 25, ibid. 238, 354;
Eccentricities of the Law of Contempt of Court (1920) 36 ibid. 394; The Writ
of Attachment (1924) 40 ibid. 43.
See Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt, supra note 14.
' "If the President has the power to pardon those who are committed for
criminal contempts .... this immemorial attribute of judicial power is thus
withdrawn from the courts and transferred to the executive .... Is there any
lfrovision of the Constitution of the United States which grants this inherent and
essential attribute of judicial power to the executive?" Sanborn, J. in Re Nevitt,
supra note i. "These (contempts) are sui generis, neither civil actions nor
prosecutions for offenses within ordinary meaning of these terms-and are exer-
ti6ns of the power inherent in all courts to enforce obedience." Mr. Justice
McReynolds in Meyers v. U. S. (1924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 272. Compare the atti-
tudd of Justice Thacher in Ex parte Hickey, supra note 4, at p. 779." A practice of
the courts however remarkable for its antiquity, however, far back 'into a remote-
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It has been urged, 'however, that the pardoning of prisoners
committed for contempt would subject the judiciary to the control ofthe executive and would tend to destroy the judiciary as an independent
branch of the government.17  Whatever weight such an argument hadin the first instance, the repeated exercise of the power to pardon without
apparent impairment of judicial power has greatly detracted from its
force.'8 The executive is an elective officer responsible to the electorate,
and is normally not likely to exercise this power except to correct hastyaction on the part of the judges. To assume gross abuse by the execu-
tive of his power is to argue for the abolition of the entire pardoning
power, since the executive might nullify the criminal laws by freeing allconvicted criminals.19 Equally so might the judiciary rob the legisla-
ture of all its function by abuse of its power to declare legislation uncon-
stitutional. It is interesting to note that similar fears for the prestige
of the judiciary were expressed more than a century ago when the
question of appellate review of contempt was considered. 20  The reply
of Senator Clinton that such fears were imaginary and idle seems still
pertinent.21
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court upheld provi-
sions of the Clayton Act for jury trials in constructive contempts. Itmay be inferred from the opinion that a provision for jury trials in
cases of direct contempts would not have been upheld.22  Should the
period it looks for its origin .... claims no respect or veneration when it isshown to be unessential to the existence, utility or preservation of those courts.This (the power to pardon contempts) is a quasi-political question."
" See Taylor v. Goodrich, supra note 6.
"s Executive pardons for contempt have been upheld from an early date. SeeDixon's Case (1841) 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 622; Rowan & Wells Case (1845) 4 ibid.458; Drayton & Sears Case (1852) 5 ibid. 579; Anonymous (i89o) ig ibid. 476." See Johnston, Constitutional Power to Pardon Contempt of Court (igo9) 12
LAw NOTES, I85.
"In the absence of statute a judgment of contempt by a court of competentjurisdiction was final and could not be reviewed by appeal or writ of error.Ex parte Kearney (1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 38; State v. Schneider (1892) 47 Mo.App. 669; Rapaljie, op. cit. sec. 141. In a few states a review was allowed incivil contempts. Haught v. Irwin (1895) 166 Pa. 548, 31 Atl. 260. This rule hasbeen modified in some jurisdictions by statute. See Leopold v. People (1892)140 Ill. 552, 3o N. E. 348. Where the rule still prevails the tendency of appellatecourts is to construe questions of jurisdiction strictly so as to check abuses ofthe contempt power. See Talbert, Review of Contempt Proceedings by Habeas
Corpus (1912) 46 Am. L. Rxv. 838.
' Clinton, Senator, in Yates v. People (i8io, N. Y. Sen.) 6 Johns. 337, 468:"The inconvenience arising from interfering with convictions of contempt ofcourt is imaginary and idle .... It is to be remembered that summary convic-.tions are against the genius and spirit of our constitution and in derogation ofcivil liberty, and the accused is without the usual guards of freedom. There isno grand jury to accuse, no petit jury to try, but his property and liberty dependupon the fiat of the court. Is not the necessity of the check at least equal to the
delegation of power?"'Michaelson v. United States (1924, U. S.) 45 -Sup. Ct. 18.
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power to pardon be also limited to constructive contempts? There
seems to be no authority for denying the power to pardon for direct
contempts. 2s In principle it seems sound to allow the power of pardon
in all criminal contempts. The distinction between direct and construc-
tive contempt is merely one of degree, and while it may be essential that
a judge have the power to summarily punish those creating a disturb-
ance in the court room without resorting to the delays of a jury trial,
it is not so patent that the punishment should be beyond mitigation:
The pardon does not take away the power to punish, but is merely the
application of executive clemency after conviction.
24
Several criminal statutes provide for injunctions to be issued by the
court restraining their violation. The disobedience of such injunctions
is by express provision made punishable as a contempt.
25 It has been
suggested that the power to pardon should be limited to such contempts
as are expressly provided for by these statutes, since the contempt
-process is merely incidental to the enforcement 
of the criminal law.
28
The proposed limitation would, however, exclude the large class of
contempts for offending the dignity of the courts where the likelihood
of judicial abuse is the greatest and where there is the most need for
such a check as is provided for by an executive pardon.
TORT RESPONSIBILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
Two recent cases, City of Shawnee v. Roush (1924, Okla.) 223 Pac.
354 and St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine (1924, Ind.) 144 N. 
E. 537, line
up on opposite sides of the question whether or not charitable corpora-
tions are responsible for the torts of their servants. The facts in the
two cases are similar: the plaintiff, a pay-patient in a charitable hospital,
was injured through the negligence of a nurse. He sues the hospital.
The Oklahoma court imposes on the charity the responsibility of any
profit-making corporation; the Indiana court imposes no responsibility
at all in the absence of negligence in the selection of the servant. In
Oklahoma the problem seems to have been presented for the first time;
in Indiana the court follows precedent.
1
All jurisdictions agree in placing the paying and the non-paying
-' There seem to be no modern cases involving the pardon of direct contempts.
The probable reason is the reluctance of the executive to pardon such offenders.
That the power to pardon for direct contempts has been exercised, see Dixon's
Case, supra note i8 (affray in the presence of the court) ; Thomas of Charthan
v. Benet of Stanford (1313) 24 Seld. Soc. 184 (assault with intent to kill 
in
presence of the court).
"See Williston, Does a Pardon Blot out Guilt (1915) 28 HARV. L. REv. 647.
" Sherman Anti-Trust Law, Act of July 2, i8go (26 Stat. at L. 2o9, sec. 4);
Clayton Act, Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 ibid. 736, secs. I5-I9) ; Volstead 
Act, Act
of Oct. 28, 1919 (4 Stat. at L. 3o6, 314, secs. 4, 22, 23).
COMMENTS (924) i9 I. L. REv. 176.
1Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sullivan (895) 241 Ind. 83, 40 N. E. 138.
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patient of a charitable corporation on a common footing,2 but they
disagree as to what that common footing shall be. "Public policy" is
frankly admitted to be the determining factor. Some courts give no
other justification for their decisions.3 But where reasons are given
they may fall within one or more of three categories. There is the
"trust fund" doctrine which declares that trdst funds may not be
diverted from the purposes of the trust, lest, by the frittering away of
its resources, the charity become crippled or wiped out.4 There is the
doctrine that respondeat superior shall not apply, since charities receive
no profit from the activities of their servants: a doctrine which, in fact,
merely states the result of the "trust fund" doctrine, but which is
nevertheless often relied on by a court to support its conclusions.5
2 E. g. Powers v. Mass. Homoeopathic Hosp. (igoi, C. C. A. ist) 1o9 Fed. 294.
'E. g. Weston v. Hosp. of St. Vincent (12i) 131 Va. 587, 1o7 S. E. 785.
" In the following cases the decision was based, wholly or in part, on the "trust
fund" doctrine: England: Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross (1846, H. L.) 12 CL & F. 5o7.
But the doctrine was not relied on in Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew Hosp. [igo9]
2 K. B. 820. United States: Lyle v. Nat. Home (19o9, C. C. E. D. Tenn.) i7o
Fed. 842. But the "waiver" doctrine was later adopted in Powers v. Mass.
Homeopathic Hosp., supra, note 2. Fordyce v. Woman's Assoc. (19o6) 79 Ark.
55o, 96 S. W. 155; Butler v. Berry School (1921) 27 Ga. App. 56o, lo9 S. E. 544;
Parks v. N. W. Univ. (1905) 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991. But recovery in contract
was allowed in Armstrong v. Wesley Hosp. (1912) 170 Ill. App. 8I; Davin v.
Kansas Benevolent Assoc. (1918) 1O3 Kan. 48, 172 Pac. 102; Cook v. Norton
Infirmary (ii8) i8o Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874; Jensen v. Maine Infirmary (igio)
1O7 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898; Loeffler v. Enoch Pratt Hosp. (1917) 13o Md. 265, 1oo
AtL 3ol; Roosen v. Brigham Hosp. (1920) 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392; Downs
v. Harper Hosp. (1894) I1 Mich. 555, 6o N. W. 42. But the "waiver" doctrine
was relied on in Bruce v. Central Church (19o7) 147 Mich. 230, i1O N. W. 951.
Nicholas v. Evangelical Home (1920) 281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643; Marble v.
Nicholas Senn Hosp. (igi8) 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208; Corbett v. Industrial
School (1903) 177 N. Y. 6, 68 N. E. 997. But the "waiver" doctrine was relied
on in Schloendorf v. N. Y. Hosp. (1914) .211 N. Y. 125, io 5 N. E. 92. Hoke v.
Glenn (94) 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Hosp.
(1922) 104 Ohio St. 6I, 135 N. E. 287; Hill v. Tualatin Academy (1912) 61 Or.
190, I2 Pac. goi; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (igio) 227 Pa. 254, 75 AtL
IO87; Vermillion v. Woman's College (1916) 104 S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649; Abston
v. Waldon Academy (1907) 118 Tenn. 24, 102 S. W. 351; Maia v. Eastern Hosp.
(1899) 97 Va. 5o7, 34 S. E. 617. This was a state agency. But the "waiver"
doctrine was relied on in Hosp. of St. Vincent v. Thompson (1914) 116 Va. ioi,
81 S. E. 13.
'In the following cases the decision was based, wholly or in part, on the doc-
trine that respondeat superior shall not apply: Union Pac. Ry. v. Artist (1894,
C. C. A. 8th) 6o Fed. 365. But the "waiver" doctrine was relied on in Powers v.
Mass. Homoeopathic-Hosp., supra note 2. Fordyce v. Woman's Assoc. (Ark)
supra note 4; Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp. (I895) 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595;
Parks v. N. W. Univ. (Ill.) supra note 4. But recovery was allowed in contract
in Armstrong v. Wesley Hosp., supra note 4; Eighmy v. Union Pac. Ry. (I895)
93 Iowa, 538, 61 N. W. 1O56; Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Assoc. (1921) 193 Ky. 400,
236 S. W. 577; Thornton v. Franklin Sq. House (1909) 200 Mass. 465, 86 N. E.
9o9; Nicholas v. Evangelical Home (Mo.) supra note 4; Hoke v. Glenn (N. C)
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And there is the doctrine of "waiver" which proceeds on the fiction that
a patient, by accepting benefits, releases the institution from all responsi-
bility for the negligence of its servants if "due care" has been exercised
in their selection.6 From these three doctrines come several degrees of
responsibility. Some courts, applying the first two, bar entirely the
recovery of any injured person, patient, employee, or utter stranger.7
supra note 4; Collins v. N. Y. Medical School (I9Ol, 2d Dept.) 59 App. Div. 63,
69 N. Y. Supp. io6. But the "waiver" doctrine was relied on in Schloendorf v.
N. Y. Hosp., supra note 4; though it was disapproved in Phillips v. Buffalo Hosp.
(1924, 4 th Dept.) 207 App. Div. 640, 2o2 N. Y. Supp. 572. There seems to be no
recent case in the Court of Appeals. Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Hosp. (Ohio)
supra note 4; Vermillion v. Woman's College (S. C.) supra note 4; Morrison v.
Henke (1917) 165 Wis. 166, 16o N. W. 173.
Some cases hold, as a plain question of agency, that members of a hospital staff
are not servants within the rule of respondeat superior. Basabo v. Salvation
Army (1912) 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. i2o; see Kellogg v. Charity Foundation (igo8,
2d Dept.) 128 App. Div. 214, 215, X12 N. Y. Supp. 566, 568. While this can well
account for some cases, it will hardly account for all, and the question of tort
responsibility remains as urgent as ever.
'In the following cases the decision was based, wholly or in part, on the
"waiver" doctrine: Powers v. Mass. Homoeopathic Hosp. (Fed.) supra note 2.
But the "trust fund" doctrine was relied on earlier in Lyle v. Nat. Home, supra
note 4. Burdell v. St. Luke's Hosp. (1918) 37 Calif. App. 31o, 173 Pac. ioo8;
Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp. (Conn.) supra note 5; Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy
(1918) 183 Iowa, 1378, 168 N. W. 219; Cook v. Norton Infirmary (Ky.) supra
note .4; Bruce v. Central Church (Mich.) supra note 4; Adams v. University
Hosp. (19o7) i22 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453; Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp.
(Neb.) supra note 4; Hoke v. Glenn (N. C.) supra note 4; Schloendorf v. N. Y.
Hosp. (N. Y.) supra note 4. But Phillips v. Buffalo Hosp., supra note 5, dis-
approves this doctrine. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (Pa.) supra note 4; Hosp.
of St. Vincent v. Thomfpson'(Va.) supra note 4. But the earlier case of Maia v.
Eastern Hosp., supra note 4, applied the "trust fund" doctrine.
" These cases favor the rule of absolute non-responsibility: Fordyce v. Woman's
Assoc. (Ark.) supra note 4; Davie v. University of Calif. (1924, Calif.) 227
Pac. 243. (A state agency.) But the "due care" modification was favored
- earlier in Burdell v. St. Luke's Hosp., supra note 6. See Johnston v. City of
Chicago (1913) 258 Ill. 494, 498, I1 N. E. 960, 962. (A state agency.) But the
"due care" modification was favored in Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hosp. (1923)
309 Ill. 147, 14o N. E. 836. And in Armstrong v. Wesley, supra note 4, recovery
in contract was allowed. See E-'.ery v. Jewish Hosp. Assoc. (Ky.) supra
note 5. But the "due care" modification was earlier favored in Ill. Central Ry. v.
Buchanan (19o7) 126 Ky. 288, 103 S. W. 272. Jensen v. Maine Infirmary (Me.)
supra note 4; Loeffler v. Enoch Pratt Hosp. (Md.) supra note 4; Kidd v. Mass.
Homoeopathic Hosp. (1921) 237 Mass. 500, 13o N. E. 55. But in Thornton v.
Franklin Sq. House, supra note 5, the "due care" modification was favored.
Downs v. Harper Hosp. (Mich.) supra note 4. But in Gallon v. House of Good
Shepherd (igog) i58 Mich. 361, 122 N. W. 631, the "due care" modification was
favored. Nicholas v. Evangelical Home (Mo.) supra note 4; Duncan v. Benevo-
lent Assoc. (1912) 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 112o. But by application of the
"waiver" doctrine recovery was allowed a stranger. Marble v. Nicholas Senn
Hosp., supra note 4; see Wilson v. N. Y. Homoeopathic College (1924, Sup. Ct.)
122 Misc. 452, 454, 204 N. Y. Supp. 175, 177. But the "due care" modification was
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Others applying the third, refuse recovery to the patient s but allow it
to the employee or stranger.1" Still others, while clinging to the
"trust fund" doctrine or to the doctrine that respondeat superior does
not apply, considerably modify their effect by declaring that recovery.
may be had against a charity if there has been negligence in the selec-
tion of the servant who caused the injury; and while in most cases there
favored in Barr v. Children's Aid (i92i, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 19o N. Y. Supp. 296.
Overholser v. Nat. Home (19o3) 68 Ohio St. 236, 67 N. E. 487. (A state agency.)
But the "due care" modification was later favored in Taylor v. Flower Deaconess
Hosp., supra note 4. O'Neil v. Odd Fellows' Home (1918) 89 Or. 382, 174 Pac.
148; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis (Pa.) supra note 4; see Vermillion v.
Woman's College (1916) io4 S. C. 197, 2Ol, 88 S. E. 649, 65o. But the "due care"
modification was earlier favored in Lindler v. Columbia Hosp. (1914) 98 S. C. 25,
81 S. E. 512. Abston v. Walden Academy (Tenn.) supra note 4; Mala v.
Eastern Hosp. (Va.) supra note 4. (A state agency.) But the "due care" modi-
fication was favored in Weston v. Hosp. of St. Vincent, supra note 3.
"A few decisions imply that if the "waiver" doctrine were to be applied, the
patient would be held to free the charity from all responsibility, even where
there had not been "due care" in selecting the servant. Adams v. University
Hosp. (19o7) 122 Mo. App. 675, 679, 99 S. W. 453, 454. Some courts, where there
has been no negligence in selection, refuse recovery, and expressly avoid the
question as to the result if negligence had been present. Powers v. Mass.
Homoeopathic Hosp. (Fed.) supra note 2, at p. 306.
'Recovery by an employee was allowed in the following cases: Thomas z.
German Benevolent Assoc. (1914) 168 Calif. 183, 141 Pac. 1I86; Bruce v. Central
Church (Mich.) supra note 4; Mclnery v. St. Luke's Hosp. (1913) 122 Minn. 1o,
141 N. W. 837. But absolute responsibility is imposed in Minnesota, see infra
note 23. Hewitt v. Woman's Assoc. (19o6) 73 N. H. 556, 64 At. 19o. This case
seems to adopt a general rule of absolute responsibility. Hordern v. Salvation
Army (igio) igg N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626; Hotel Dieu v. Armendariz (I914,
Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. 181.
Contra: Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Assoc. (Ky.) supra note 5; Freel v. Craw-
fordsville (1895) 142 Ind. 27,' 41 N. E. 312 (a state agency) ; Zoulalian v. N. E.
Sanitarium (i18) 23o Mass. IO2, 119 N. E. 686 (Workmen's Compensation Act);
Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hosp. (igog) 137 Mo. App. i16, 117 S. W. 1189; Corbett
v. St. Vincent's School (19o3, 4th Dept.) 79 App. Div. 334, 79 N. Y. Supp. 369.
But by reliance on the "waiver" doctrine recovery was later allowed in Hordern
v. Salvation Army, supra. O'Neil v. Odd Fellows' Home (Or.) supra note 7;
see Vermillion v. Woman's College (S. C.) supra note 7; see Bachman v.
Y. W. C. A. (922) 179 Wis. 178, 182, xgx N. W. 751, 753.
"A stranger was permitted to recover in the following cases: Gallon v. House
of Good Shepherd (Mich.) supra note 7; Marble v. Nicholas Senn Hosp. (Neb.)
supra note 4; Van Ingen v. Jewish Hosp. (1920) 227 N. Y. 665, 126 N. E. 924;
Basabo v. Salvation Army (912) 35 R. I. 22, 85 Atl. i2o. But this case favors
the rule of absolute responsibility.
Contra: Fordyce v. Woman's Assoc. (Ark.) supra note 4; see Emery v. Jewish
Hosp. Assoc. (1921) 193 Ky. 400, 410, 236 S. W. 577, 582; Loeffler v. Enoch Pratt
Hosp. (Md.) supra note 4; Benton v. City Hosp. (1885) 140 Mass. 13, 1 N. E.
836; Hill v. Tualatin (Or.) supra note 4; Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd (1888) 120
Pa. 624, i5 At. 553; Vermillion v. Woman's College (Va.) supra note 4; Bach-
man v. Y. W. C. A. (Wis.) supra note 9; see Lyle v. Nat. Home (Fed.) supra
note 4, at p. 845.
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is no such negligence and recovery is refused,1 in a few the rule is
applied to permit recovery.'
2
All three doctrines are open to attack. The doctrine of "waiver" is
a mere fiction :'s for who could maintain that a patient, coming in sick-
ness to a hospital, ever for a moment considers the possibility of a suit
against the institution? *The "trust fund" doctrine, logically applied,
should completely protect the trust funds from tapping for purposes
outside the trust.14 But a charity, even when an agency of the state,"
5
The following cases favor the rule that there can be no recovery by patients
where there has been "due care" in the selection of servants: Deming Ladies
Hosp. v. Price (i921, C. C. A. 8th) 276 Fed. 668; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hosp.
(Calif.) supra note 6. But absolute non-responsibility was later favored in
Davie v. University of Calif., supra note 7. Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp. (Conn.)
supra note 5; South Florida Ry. v. Price (1893) 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638; Butler v.
Berry School (Ga.) supra note 4; farabia v. Thompson Hosp. (Il.) supra
note 7. But absolute non-responsibility was favored earlier in Johnston v. City
of Chicago, supra note 7, Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy (Iowa) supra note 6;
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sullivan (Ind.) supra note i; Davin v. Kansas
Benevolent Assoc. (Kan.) supra note 4; Thornton v. Franklin Sq. House (Mass.)
supra note 5. But absolute non-responsibility was favored in Kidd v. Mass.
Homoeopathic Hasp., supra note 7. Gallon v. House of Good Shepherd (Mich.)
supra note 7. But absolute non-responsibility was favored in Downs v. Harper
Hasp., supra note 4. Hoke v. Glenn (N. C.) supra note 4; Barr v. Children's
Aid (N. Y.) supra note 7. But absolute non-responsibility was favored in
Wilson v. N. Y. Homoeopathic College, supra note 7. Taylor v. Flower Dea-
coness Hasp. (Ohio) supra note 4; Lindler v. Columbia Hosp. (S. C.) supra
note 7. But absolute non-responsibility was favored in Vermillion v. Woman'-*
College, supra note 7. Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium (i921, Tex. Civ. App.)
229 S. W. 588; Gitzhoffen v. Holy Cross Hasp. (907) 32 Utah, 46, 88 Pac. 691;
Weston v. Hosp. of St. Vincent (Va.) supra note 3; Morrison v. Henke (Wis.)
supra note 5.
The rule that "due care" in the selection of servants is a personal non-delegable
duty of the master seems to account for this modification of a charitable institu-
tion's non-responsibility. McInery v. St. Luke's Hasp. (Minn.) supra note 9.
But if "a charity is not to be liable for the negligence of its employees it should
equally not be held liable for the negligence of its officers and managers." Zoll-
man, Liability of Charitable Institutions (1921) ig MIcH. L. REv. 395, 406. The
modification has been rejected in Massachusetts on this ground. Roosen v.
Brigham Hasp., supra note 4, at p. 72.
"In these cases the "due care" rule was applied affirmatively and recovery
allowed: Ill. Central Ry. v. Buchanan (Ky.) supra note 7. But the rule of
absolute non-responsibility was favored later in Emery v. Jewish Hosp., supra
note 5. McInery v. St. Luke's Hasp. (Minn.) supra note 9. But the rule of
absolute responsibility was adopted later in Mulliner v. Evangelischer, etc. (192o)
144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699. St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson (1914, Tex.
Civ. App.) x64 S. W. 36; Magnuson v.'Swedish Hosp. (1918) 99 Wash. 399, i69
Pac. 828.
"Gamble v. Vanderbilt University (i918) 138 Tenn. 616, 2oo S. W. 51o;
Phillips v. *Buffalo Gen'l Hasp. (N. Y.) supra note 5.
"See Love v. Nashville Institute (1922) 146 Tenn. 550, 564, 243 S. W. 304, 308.
"City of Paducah v. Allen (igoi)' iii Ky. 361, 63 S. W. 981. The ground for
the decision was that freedom from responsibility would be in violation of the
COMMENTS
must respond in damages if it has been guilty of creating a nuisance;"
or if a tort has been committed in the course of the administration of the
trust ;17 and where a suit has been prosecuted against a trustee personally
for alleged misconduct as trustee of which he was not guilty, he may
reimburse himself from the funds appropriated to the trust.1 8  The
adoption of the "due care" modification affords still another oppor-
tunity for such wastage. Likewise, the fact that a nuisance has been
committed by a servant does not free the charity from responsibility.19
And the "due care" modification adds this further inconsistency: that
respondeat superior will apply to the manager of a hospital (who is a
servant of the corporation) if he has been negligent in selecting a sub-
servant; but it will not apply where the sub-servant has been negli-
gent.2 0  But since public policy is the dominant consideration, these
technical defects might be overlooked. It would seem better to impose
the appropriate responsibility frankly on that ground, without more
specific rationalization. But since courts find it necessary to give
reasons, the various doctrines, with their modifications, serve their
purpose; for a court when it has determined what protection the
interests of the community require to be afforded to a charitable corpora-
tion, can choose the doctrine that will most accurately support its
conclusion.2 1  And the doctrine so chosen will, if consistently applied,
bring a consistent result.
2 2
clause in the state constitution providing that: "Municipal and other corporations,
and individuals invested with the privilege of taking property for public use,
shall make just compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed."
'6Love v. Nashville Institute (Tenn.) supra note 14. Here it was said that
the "trust fund" doctrine being the "child of public policy" should give way to
public policy.
"'Responsibility has been imposed where the tort was committed in a non-
charitable activity. Stewart v. Harvard College (1866, Mass.) 12 Allen, 58;
Holder v. Mass Hort. Society (1912) 211 Mass. 370, 97 N. E. 630.
'Bennett v. Wyndham (1862, Ch.) 4 De G. F. & J. 259.
"Baker v. Tibbetts (1895) 162 Mass. 468, 39 N. E. 350.
"See supra note ii.
'Where the injury has arisen from the breach of a contractual duty, courts
have sometimes been induced to grant recoviery, regardless of their rule of tort
responsibility. Canada: Thompson v. Coast Mission (1914) 15 D. L. R. 656;
United States: Armstrong v. Wesley Hosp. (Ill.) supra note 4; Roche v. St.
John's Hosp. (1916, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 96 Misc. 289, i6o N. Y. Supp. 401; Hall-
Moody Institute v. Copass (19o2) io8 Tenn. 582, 69 S. W. 327; see Gitzhoffen v.
Holy Cross Hosp. (1907) 32 Utah, 46, 61, 88 Pac. 691, 696; see Union Pac. Ry. v.
Artist (Fed.) supra note 5, at p. 369. Contra: Davin v. Kansas Benevolent
Assoc. (Kan.) supra note 4; see Roosen v. Brigham Hosp. (1920) 235 Mass: 66,
75, 126 N. E. 392, 397; see Downs v. Harper Hosp. (1894) 1oi Mich. 555, 556,
60 N. W. 42, 43; Duncan v. Neb. Benevolent Assoc. (1912) 92 Neb. 162, 137
N. W. 112o; see Wilson v. N. Y. Homoeopathic Hosp. (N. Y.) supra note 7.
"The non-responsibility of the state (under the dogma that the "king can do
no wrong") is in some part responsible for the non-responsibility of charitable
corporations. This dogma has been severely criticized. Borchard, Gov~rnment
Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE LAW JouRNAL, z ff. But courts, nevertheless,
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The Oklahoma case, supra, imposes the responsibility of any profit-
making corporation.23 This, it is submitted, best serves the welfare of
society. The modern tendency, through various forms of insurance,-
fire, accident, life, workmen's compensation acts, and the like-is to
shift the burden from the innocent victim to the community.
2 4 The
cases that adopt rules relieving charitable corporations from responsi-
bility, wholly or in part, indicate the fear that any other policy will
result in the disappearance of charities through the failure of donations
and the dissipation of funds. Even if some reason for fear be admitted,
a distinction should be drawn between private charities and those created
and supported by the state. The public charity has the taxing power of
the state to support it.2 5  In England, Canada, and those states where
absolute responsibility is imposed, these fears have hardly been realized.
Under the present majority rules charitable institutions can with
impunity allow their servants to be negligent towards patients. The
cases sentimentalize much about the unfairness of subjecting the "Good
Samaritan" to an action for damages.26 The alternative is that those
must suffer whom the charities were organized to benefit.
instinctively, where a charity is created and supported by the state, free it from
liability. See many cases in Borchard, op. cit. supra, at p. 25. Where it is not
so created, but where its functions are of a "governmental nature," an analogy
is drawn to support the same rule. Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd (Pa.) supra note io.
A charity may be technically private and still be in receipt of funds from the
public treasury. It is thus impossible to say whether it is in fact public or
private. Gallon v. House of Good Shepherd (Mich.) supra note 7. If its
"objects" are "benevolent and charitable" the courts consider it a "charity" regard-
less of the source of its funds or the method of its creation. Zoulalian v. N. E.
Sanitarium (Mass.) supra note 9. Purely private charities are thus often drawn
in under the same rule. Some writers, however, attempt to treat private charities
and agencies of the state on an entirely different footing, overlooking the fact
that the cases do not seem to distinguish between the two classes, and that such
distinction in fact is hardly possible. See Zollman, op. cit. supra note ii, at pp.
395, 397, 398.
'This case adopts the rule favored in the following jurisdictions: England:
Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew Hosp., supra note 4; Canada: Donaldson v. Gen'l
Hosp. (i8go) 30 N. B. 279; United States:'Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary (ii5)
191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4; Mulliner v. Evangelischer, etc. (192o) 144 Minn. 392, 175
N. W. 699; Glavin v. R. I. Hosp. (1879) 12 R. I. 411. This case was subse-
quently overruled by legislative enactment. R. I. Gen. Laws, 1896, p. 538. But
see Basabo v. Salvation Army (1912) 35 P- I. 22, 43, 44, 85 Afd. 120, 129. See
Hewitt v. Woman's Assoc. (i9o6) 73 N. H. 556, 565, 64 At. 19o, 192.
"The modern tendency is also shown by growing agitation for some form of
compulsory insurance to be taken out by owners of automobiles to pay damages
to those injured in automobile accidents. See Marx, The Curse of the Personal
Injury Suit (1924) io A. B. A. JouP. 491.
See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1925) 34 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
249.
. Powers v. Mass. Homoeopathic Hosp. (Fed.) supra note 2, at p. 304.
